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A Framework for Facilitating Classroom Dialogue

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Abstract: Classroom dialogue can be democratic and evidence critical and creative thinking, yet lose momentum and direction without a plan for systematic inquiry. This article presents a six-stage framework for facilitating philosophical dialogue in pre-college and college classrooms, drawn from John Dewey and Matthew Lipman. Each stage involves particular kinds of thinking and aims at a specific product or task. The role of the facilitator—illustrated with suggestive scripts—is to help the participants move their dialogue through the stages of the framework and to model and prompt good social and cognitive dialogue moves within each stage, until the participants learn to become self-managed.

In this article I present a framework I have used for facilitating philosophical dialogue with children, schoolteachers and graduate students, in my work for the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC). Within the eastern and western philosophical traditions there are a variety of purposes and corresponding methods for dialogue.¹ Philosophy for Children, as it is promulgated by the IAPC and especially as a world movement, is catholic in its recognition of multiple uses and methods of philosophical dialogue. Nevertheless, notions of inquiry and of the community of inquiry from Peirce, Mead and Dewey inform the practice of dialogue recommended in the IAPC curriculum² and in theoretical works by certain scholars affiliated with the Institute.³ In line with this program, the framework I present is meant to be an aid for conducting dialogue construed as systematic, collaborative inquiry. I think of such inquiry as having a trajectory in the shape of an arc, beginning with some kind of question, problem or vague opportunity, and ending in some kind of satisfactory resolution or fulfillment.

Though philosophical inquiry has seldom been credited as a worthwhile activity for school children in this country, classroom dialogue


has been recognized as an important pedagogy for helping students construct sound understandings of content across the disciplines.⁴ In Philosophy for Children, dialogue is similarly intended as a mechanism for children and adults to explore the complex content of philosophical issues, but just as importantly, and as a means to that exploration, dialogue is also employed as the principle method for teaching thinking and inquiry.⁵ In my experience and that of my colleagues, children and adults without philosophical training are nevertheless capable of discerning ethical, aesthetic, political and other philosophical dimensions of their own experience, of recognizing problematic aspects of that experience, and of inquiring toward judgment and action intended to resolve what is problematic in that experience. Though pragmatist in outline, this understanding and practice of philosophy as an art of living rather than a strictly intellectual exercise is in line with many other philosophical schools and programs, ancient and modern.⁶

As will be obvious, the framework presented here is not original. Apart from being made compatible with the curriculum and practice of Philosophy for Children, it is based on the process of inquiry Dewey described, especially in *How We Think* and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.⁷ While it could not be maintained that inquiry is the only appropriate method of problem solving,⁸ that dialogue is a necessary component of all inquiry, or that classroom dialogue is the best pedagogy for all educational objectives,⁹ I take Dewey's process of collaborative inquiry to be a philosophically-informed method applicable to a wide variety of questions, difficulties and opportunities, not only those recognizably philosophical.¹⁰ Indeed, the classroom community of inquiry has been recommended and successfully used in primary, secondary and college education classrooms in science,¹¹ mathematics,¹² history,¹³ art,¹⁴ ethics and citizenship education,¹⁵ and philosophy of education.¹⁶ Accordingly, the framework presented here is intended for structuring group discussions across the disciplines as well as in non-pedagogical contexts such as peer mediation, and across a range of ages and levels of expertise. The utility of this framework is first, that it translates that process into distinguishable stages that can serve as a simple roadmap for classroom dialogue; second it identifies a product to be produced or a task to be accomplished as the culmination of each stage; third, it specifies thinking moves that are particularly important to each stage; and fourth, it offers scripted facilitation moves to illustrate how a facilitator might prompt the kinds of work called for in each stage (see Appendix, pp. 76–80).¹⁷ Of course, expertise in facilitating dialogue is not a matter of following a checklist or rehearsing a script. The framework presented here is intended rather as a roadmap for teachers less familiar with the terrain.

In my work in pre-school through university classrooms around the world I have often seen classroom dialogues that are highly democratic and that evidence many kinds of critical and creative thinking, yet tend to be disorganized and haphazard, lacking direction and momentum, because of a lack of a shared framework for systematic inquiry. The framework I present here is not a substitute for the social and cognitive virtues that distinguish rigorous dialogue from other modes of discourse; it is intended to structure the exercise of those virtues so that they can reinforce and build on each other toward a meaningful resolution of the questions at hand. Regarding those virtues, the framework can be used pedagogically: students can learn the principles and the uses of argumentation and informal logic, as well as habits of democratic interaction, by engaging in this kind of dialogue with a strong facilitator who both models the virtues and evokes them from students through questions and observations.

The framework consists of six stages (see Figure 1, p. 62). There is an order to the stages, but the order isn't lock-stepped: the dialogue can move back and forth between stages and even jump around among them, so long as the participants know where they are within the framework and which tasks have been accomplished (see Figure 2, p. 63). All participants should be familiar with the stages, and paying attention to which tasks have been completed is a good way for the group to locate its position within the framework. Individual participants may find one or more of the stages difficult or uninteresting, given their experience and interests. Part of what makes dialogue so meaningful and efficacious for inquiry is that it is an intersection of the different inquiries and journeys of the participants; though the kind of dialogue described in the framework below is only possible if individual participants see themselves as partners in one collaborative inquiry, if they commit to a shared agenda of questions and to shared methods of pursuing those questions.¹⁸

The role of the facilitator is twofold: (1) to model and to call for good dialogue moves (cognitive and social), and (2) to help the participants keep track of how the dialogue progresses through the stages of the framework. In her role as pedagogue the facilitator should intervene with moves such as identifying assumptions overlooked by the group, identifying important alternative views not raised by the group, and nudging the group from one stage to the next. It is expected that these facilitation moves will be mimicked by the participants as they internalize the facilitator's insights, so that the facilitator's role becomes "distributed"¹⁹ throughout the group, *i.e.*, the group gets better at self-management and moving itself through the framework. In time, students should be making the kinds of facilitation moves scripted below with each other. Collective facilitation is an ideal that can't be


Figure 1: Stages of Dialogical Inquiry

forced, but that is likely to emerge when the initial facilitator is both effective and transparent in her interventions.

The following are suggestions for staging the dialogue:

- Whether the dialogue is scheduled or spontaneous it must be prompted by some kind of stimulus, *e.g.*, a shared reading or viewing, the telling of an experience, a report of a current event, the voicing of a complaint.
- It is preferable that the participants are able to see and respond directly to each other, *e.g.*, by sitting in a circle or by means of technology.
- Participants may take turns talking by raising hands for the facilitator, by calling on each other (which I prefer) or by randomly jumping in.
- The dialogue should be periodically self-evaluated by the participants, especially as to social and cognitive virtues and inquiry outcomes. The facilitator should conduct her own periodic evaluations of the progress of the group, *e.g.*, by guided observations of video tapes, in order to diagnose strengths and weaknesses and to offer focused practice on areas of weakness.²⁰

Figure 2: Procedural Flow of Dialogical Inquiry



- The facilitator should not pressure the group to come to convergence of opinion. Dissent and even factions can be productive, so long as mutual respect is maintained. Disparate factions should use the same process to test their hypotheses.
- Inquiries taken through all six stages may take a few or even several class periods to complete, which realization puts a legitimate pressure on the community to choose its questions judiciously.

Stage One: Identify Issues Relevant to Purposes

In classroom and professional settings alike, the community's ability to sustain the rigor of legitimate inquiry depends on the identification of some problem, opportunity or other issue meaningful enough to justify the effort. Issues ripe for inquiry may arise in any number of contexts, but in any case what counts as an issue worth pursuing depends on the purposes and interests of the community members, and so these should be consulted.

As David Hildebrand recommends, following Dewey, "In any situation where there is a problem, something is felt as well as known to be wrong. . . . That initial feeling is important because it can act as a guide later on. When evaluating an issue, it's important to try to empathize with what is distinctively *felt* to be problematic."²¹ The kind of "thinking" involved in this stage includes emotional intelligence or "caring thinking,"²² such as being aware of and articulating our personal and collective interests, desires and values, relative to possible issues to be explored. What aspects of our experience does the issue potentially illuminate? What kind of frustration are we facing? What stake do we have in dealing with our frustration? What do we want to know?

The product of this stage of the inquiry is an articulation of issues to be explored in the inquiry and the purposes for doing so. Individual and collective purposes can evolve throughout the inquiry, but an initial articulation is important, especially to guide the next stage of the inquiry: generating questions for dialogue. Once purposes are decided, it is possible to ask whether all significant aspects of the problem or issue have been identified, relevant to those purposes. It may be that purposes articulated for initial inquiries are so lasting and relevant to subsequent inquiries that Stage One need not be repeated for every dialogue. However, the importance of purposes should be kept in mind, and the community should be ready to re-visit and revise initial purposes, or to identify new ones, at any time.

The following scripted facilitation moves for identifying issues and purposes are meant to be suggestive only:

- What feelings does this prompt that call for resolution, *e.g.*, frustration, confusion, curiosity, sensing something valuable?
- What did we find puzzling, interesting or confusing?
- What range of issues does this text/experience raise for us? What does it make us wonder about?
- (What) does any of this matter? (How) are the issues relevant to our experience? What aspects of our experience do the issues potentially illuminate? What's at stake for us regarding these issues, personally and collectively?

- What issues would be worth discussing? What do we want to know? What do we need to decide? What kinds of judgment seem called for?
- What will our purposes be in conducting an inquiry into any of the issues raised?
- Have we identified all of the significant aspects of the problems or issues to be explored, relevant to our purposes?

Stage Two: Formulate and Organize Relevant Questions

There are two different tasks to accomplish in this stage of the inquiry. The first is to generate a number of questions relevant to the problem identified. It's generally good to begin this task as an exercise in creative brainstorming: listing as many questions as occur to the participants without worrying too much about relevance or redundancy. The second task is to organize the questions into a sequence or another order that will structure the inquiry. A good way to do this is to look for relationships among the questions generated, such as logical priority, redundancy, and other relationships indicated in the facilitation moves listed below. Because discussion questions often arise in the course of establishing purposes, stages one and two may be accomplished more or less simultaneously.

Not all questions generated will be fruitful for dialogue. In general (with important exceptions), three categories of questions are not fruitfully answered by dialogue:

- Questions that we assume to have definitive answers already, *e.g.*, that we could find in a database or by consulting experts.
- Questions that we assume we know how to answer, *e.g.*, by calculation, observation or experiment.
- Questions that we assume can only be answered by means of privileged access to certain kinds of truth or insight, *e.g.*, religious or mystical.²³

It is useful to make these kinds of categorical distinctions when setting the dialogue agenda, and to make a plan for researching answers to empirical questions. The order to be imposed on the remaining dialogical questions should facilitate the purposes identified in the previous stage, and it is good to check the revised question set against the articulated purposes and make mutual adjustments. Because no actual situation of dialogue and especially no classroom dialogue can explore all relevant questions pertaining to all the issues and purposes that can be raised around a problematic text or experience, there is inevitably and legitimately an aspect of negotiation in the process of constructing the agenda of issues and questions. The group must come to an agreement about priorities.

Ordering the questions typically requires clarifying them to some extent. Douglas Walton warns that, "If the question is confused or badly stated, then the inquiry will go wrong from the very beginning because those involved lack a clear understanding of the problem."²⁴ Too much may be made of this caution, as much of the meaning of questions posed for dialogue is only *potential* and cannot be developed apart from the dialogue itself. Yet, it is undeniable that certain "questions lack sufficient clarity or specificity to be good problems to begin with in a well-directed inquiry that is likely to be successful," and that "deficiencies or obstructive failures [for inquiry] can occur . . . even during the very beginning phases of asking the question or formulating the problem."²⁵

A well-ordered list of questions is the product that signals the end of this stage of the inquiry, though additional questions may be added to the list in the course of the inquiry. It is important that participants be able to identify which question is being addressed at any point in the dialogue, and for that reason it is generally best to take up—*i.e.*, to generate and test hypotheses to—one question at a time.

The following scripted facilitation moves for formulating and organizing questions are meant to be suggestive only:

- What questions does the text, situation, *etc.*, raise for us?
- Do our questions cover all of the important aspects of the issue?
- Do any of these questions suggest other questions not yet asked?
- Can we think of a question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue?
- Is there redundancy among our questions? Could some of them be combined?
- Is there an over-all question here?
- Does this question have more than one part or sub-question?
- Are there any "Q-Q's" (questions inside questions)?²⁶ Does this question assume something that needs to be questioned itself?
- Is there a logical priority to some of our questions? Do some questions require or assume answers to others?
- Is there a priority of need or importance among the questions for us?
- What other relationships are there among our questions?

Stage Three: Formulate and Organize Hypotheses in Response to Questions

The end product of this stage of the dialogue is one or more hypotheses or possible answers to one of the questions. The kind of thinking

called for in this stage is abduction: the informed generation of likely hypotheses.²⁷ As with the questions, it usually works best to brainstorm hypotheses without trying to critique them at the same time. Critiquing hypotheses is the next stage of the dialogue. If more than one hypothesis is suggested in response to a question, the hypotheses should be organized in order of how they will be critiqued.

The following scripted facilitation moves for formulating and organizing hypotheses are meant to be suggestive only:

- What are some possible answers to the question?
- What's your opinion?
- What kind of hypothesis is that? Explanatory? Predictive? Evaluative? Something else?
- Does that hypothesis respond to all or only part of the question?
- Does that hypothesis respond to more than one question?
- Can we try to see the issue from another point of view?
- Are any other beliefs on this subject possible?
- Is there redundancy among these hypotheses?
- (How) are these two hypotheses different?
- Is there a logical priority to some of our hypotheses?
- Are any of these hypotheses in tension or conflict with each other?

Stage Four: Clarify and Test Hypotheses, and Confirm, Revise, or Abandon

This stage of the dialogue has three distinct tasks to be accomplished with regard to each hypothesis: first, to clarify it, second, to test it by means of arguments and evidence, and third to either confirm, revise or abandon it in light of the results of the testing. I will present thinking moves and facilitation moves for each task. Many of the kinds of thinking helpful for these tasks are operations of informal logic. The end product of this stage of the dialogue is a list of hypotheses that have survived critique, in original or revised form.

Task 1: Clarify the Hypothesis

Two kinds of thinking moves are important to this task: clarifying meaning and detecting assumptions. Both are important throughout the dialogue and the scripted facilitation moves suggested for each may be used in every stage.

A. Clarifying Meaning

Peirce argued that concepts are inherently vague and that there is no such thing as clarifying the meaning of a concept completely or essen-

tially, only clarifying it usefully enough to accomplish some purpose.²⁸ Though it is a common dialogical practice to attempt to “define our terms” before discussing substantive issues, the attempt commonly results in a proliferation of potential meanings that tend to encumber rather than advance the inquiry. Because clarification requires a context, requests for clarification should be made when an ambiguity has arisen, at which point divergent interpretations will have consequences for the direction of the inquiry. It is the content and movement of a particular dialogue that *makes* a particular term ambiguous, and that both reveals and constrains potential relevant meanings for it. To ask what the term should mean at *this* juncture of *this* dialogue (this new and tentative web of meanings) is more helpful than asking what it means in general.

Monroe Beardsley helpfully defines vagueness of hypotheses in terms of verifiability: a hypothesis is sufficiently clear for purposes of inquiry if it “refers to some possible experience that can be verified or falsified by the collection of data.”²⁹ Empirical data is not always relevant to philosophical inquiry, but verifiability is no less a requirement of philosophical than of empirical hypotheses. To be meaningful, at least in the context of dialogue, philosophical hypotheses must be testable by argument or some kind of evidence. Again, however, whether and how a philosophical hypothesis is testable in dialogue may not be determinable in advance of the dialogue.

Thinking moves to be employed in clarifying the meaning of a hypothesis include defining, restating, making distinctions, using criteria, giving examples, qualifying and quantifying. The following scripted facilitation moves for clarifying meaning are meant to be suggestive only:

- What do you mean by ____? How are you using the word ____? How should we define ____?
- Are you saying that ____? I hear you saying _____.
- What would be another way of putting that?
- I didn’t understand when you said ____.
- Does there seem to be anything vague or ambiguous in this hypothesis?
- What criteria are you using?
- Do we need to be more specific?
- Can someone else say what you understand his point to be?
- Can you or someone else think of an example? How is that example relevant?
- Are you making a distinction between ____ and ____?
- How is ____ different from ____?
- Would you qualify your categorical premise with “all,” “most,” or “some”?

- What's the difference between what you're saying and what she said?
- How would we go about testing this hypothesis?

B. Detecting Assumptions

Assumptions are un-articulated premises taken to be true without having been critiqued. There is no way to eliminate all assumptions from our intellectual work, or even to make them apparent to us.³⁰ Nevertheless, we can develop a knack for detecting assumptions or at least remember to be on the lookout for them. Assumptions we identify have the status of new hypotheses to be critiqued, *i.e.*, clarified and tested. They should be added as sub-hypotheses to the list of hypotheses developed in Stage Three. The following scripted facilitation moves for detecting assumptions are meant to be suggestive only:

- Are there any hidden assumptions in this hypothesis?
- Are we assuming that . . . ?
- What is being assumed here?
- Is that a reasonable assumption?
- Why are we assuming it must be either this or that?
- Why would someone make that assumption?
- Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?

Task 2: Test the Hypothesis with Arguments and Evidence

The task of testing hypotheses is generally the most complex and lengthy stage of the dialogue. It involves a number of optional operations that interact in ways too complex and too context-specific to be mapped out in advance. I will not attempt to explain the reasoning involved in each operation (which would amount to a course in informal logic), but I will suggest scripted facilitation moves for each. Again, it is preferable to test hypotheses one by one.

A. Giving Reasons

Two broad categories of reasons are arguments and evidence, each of which is treated in more detail below. But with younger children it can be useful to elicit reasons without differentiating as to type. The following scripted facilitation moves for eliciting reasons are meant to be suggestive only:

- Why? What makes you think so? What are your reasons for saying that?
- Do you agree or disagree, and why?
- If someone wanted to disagree with you, what would she say?

- How many different reasons can we think of?
- Is that a good reason?
- Are any of these reasons better than others?

B. Deductive Arguments: Categorical Inferences

Older students will be able to offer reasons in the nature of arguments. There are many kinds of arguments that can be made for and against a hypothesis. Two commonly useful kinds of arguments are deductive and inductive arguments (also known as necessary and probable inferences, respectively). In this dialogical framework I include two kinds of deductive arguments: categorical and hypothetical inferences (or syllogisms). The task of the facilitator is not to try to elicit every type of argument about each hypothesis, but to help participants recognize the types of arguments they are offering and how each should be constructed and evaluated, and to suggest other useful types. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating categorical inferences are meant to be suggestive only:

- Is this a categorical statement/premise?
- Would you qualify your categorical premise with “all,” “most,” or “some”?
- Is it true that “all”/“no”/“some” _____ are _____?
- What follows?
- Are you making a categorical inference/syllogism?
- Does it follow? Is this inference valid?

C. Deductive Arguments: Hypothetical Inferences

The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating hypothetical inferences are meant to be suggestive only:

- If so, then what? What are the implications?
- Is this a hypothetical (if-then) statement/premise?
- In what sense is it true that “if P then Q”? Is it a predictive hypothesis (a hypothesis of correlation)? A causal hypothesis? A categorical or definitional hypothesis?
- Does anything follow from this hypothetical premise?
- Are you making a hypothetical inference/syllogism?
- Is this inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?

D. Inductive Arguments

Inductive arguments make inferences to conclusions that are probable rather than necessary. In empirical studies, inductive reasoning is used to claim that what is true of a random sample is very likely true of the

entire population from which that sample was drawn. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating inductive arguments are meant to be suggestive only:

- Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case?
- How probable do the available reasons/evidence make this claim?
- Is the evidence strong enough to support that conclusion?
- Was the sample relied on to make this generalization randomly drawn?
- Was the sample relied on to make this generalization representative of the population? What are the relevant characteristics?
- How big was the sample relied on to make this generalization?
- Was a control group used?
- Are the risks of relying on this generalization reasonable in relation to the stakes?

E. Arguments by Analogy

Analogies are arguments that since two things are alike in one way, they must be alike in another way as well. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating arguments by analogy are meant to be suggestive only:

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of that analogy?
- How are these two things or situations alike?
- Is it reasonable to think that because these things are alike in this way that they will also be alike in that way?

F. Identify and Defeat Fallacious Arguments

Fallacies are unreasonable arguments made either mistakenly or deliberately and deceptively. It is important that dialogue participants watch out for each other's fallacies, especially because thinking mistakes are easier to notice in others than in oneself. The "distribution" among the entire group of this alertness for fallacies is one of the most important advantages of collaborative inquiry.

I concur with Walton that arguments are only fallacious relative to the goals and norms of particular and distinct types of dialogue.³¹ What makes an argument fallacious is not its being an illegitimate form or type, but its illegitimate use or function in a particular dialogue. This means that the same argument may be fallacious in one stage of the framework and legitimate in another.³² Therefore, the following scripted facilitation moves should be understood as examples of identifying and

defeating some arguments that would likely be fallacious in many of the stages of the framework:

- Is that source an appropriate authority?
- Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of who offered it?
- Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of peer pressure?
- Are you supporting that position just because it's a middle-of-the-road position?
- Isn't what you're saying now inconsistent with what you said earlier?
- Didn't that word mean something different when you used it earlier?
- (Why) does it matter how many people agree about this?
- Aren't you distorting the other person's position?
- Isn't that distinction really a false dichotomy?
- How is that relevant?

G. Evaluating Evidence

Evidence includes facts and expert opinion made relevant by means of an argument, *i.e.*, as the premises of an argument. Part of the evaluation of all deductive arguments must be the evaluation of the truth of the premises, and part of the evaluation of all inductive arguments must be an evaluation of the quality and the quantity of the evidence in support of the generalization. In a classroom dialogue, participants are usually limited to searching for examples and counter examples from their own experience. This is an important means of keeping the inquiry relevant to their lives. But if important facts are at issue some research should be done. The following scripted facilitation moves for evaluating evidence are meant to be suggestive only:

- Can you or someone else think of an example? Are there other examples?
- We have a number of examples already; can anyone offer a counter-example?
- What would count as a counter-example to this generalization?
- (How) is that evidence relevant?
- Is that an established fact? How was it established?
- Is that true? Is it always true? Is it true everywhere? How do we know?
- Is this something that has to be determined by expert opinion? Where could we look for such opinion? What qualifies an expert to have an opinion about this? Is there agreement among qualified experts?

- Is this something that could only be established by empirical research? Where could we look for such research? Are we qualified to conduct it ourselves?
- Is this evidence strong enough, in view of what's at stake?

Task 3: Confirm, Revise, or Abandon Hypothesis

Hypotheses should be revised throughout Tasks 1 and 2 of this Stage, which involves further creative thinking that can incorporate developing arguments and evidence. At any point in the dialogue it may become clear that a hypothesis should be abandoned, but judgment that a hypothesis has been confirmed should be postponed until it has been tested thoroughly—thoroughness being relative to what's at stake. Confirmation at this stage of the dialogue means that the hypothesis is worth testing in experience outside the dialogue. The facilitator should urge participants toward judgments about their hypotheses with moves such as the following:

- Is that a reason to revise the hypothesis?
- Is that a reason to abandon the hypothesis?
- Are these arguments and/or this evidence sufficient to confirm this hypothesis?
- Have we sufficiently tested this hypothesis with our best thinking?
- Is there any other way this hypothesis might be mistaken?
- Has the meaning of this hypothesis changed? How can we clarify the new meaning?
- Looking at the surviving hypotheses, have we come closer to solving the problem or answering the question?

Stage Five: Experiment with Hypotheses in Experience and Warrant, Revise, or Abandon

At some point in this stage of the inquiry dialogue is postponed while the fruits of the preceding dialogue—hypotheses that have survived dialogical critique—are given experiment in experience outside of the dialogue circle. New meanings of old concepts should be tested in a variety of discursive contexts, especially outside the classroom. New empirical propositions should be tested by observation and experiment. New value propositions such as kinds of health and friendship worth cultivating should be acted on and evaluated against the resulting qualitative experience. The lesson to be learned from this state of the inquiry is that hypotheses established successfully in collaborative dialogue are to be held as hypothetical and fallible until they are established meaningfully in the wider spheres of experience that were initially judged to be problem-

atic. This stage is somewhat controversial, as not all philosophers would agree that experimentation—particularly in non-discursive contexts—is a proper part of philosophical inquiry. However, it is a necessary stage of philosophical practice understood as an art of living.³³

The task of this stage of the inquiry is to contrive empirical experiments that will determine whether a hypothesis resolves the issue begun with and so deserves to be implemented by reconstructing our behaviors. Whether it does so will depend on the purposes articulated in Stage One. The principal kind of thinking involved in this stage is practical reasoning, which Walton describes as “goal-directed, knowledge-based, and action-guiding.”³⁴ Following the experiment, the hypothesis is again abandoned, revised, or *warranted* (as opposed being confirmed by discursive testing). The following scripted facilitation moves for experimenting with hypotheses are meant to be suggestive only:

- How could we act on this hypothesis?
- How can we experiment with this hypothesis, *i.e.*, test it in our experience outside the dialogue?
- How will we be able to tell if it resolves the issue we began with? What might we expect to observe? What kinds of consequences would count as confirming and disconfirming the hypothesis? What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?
- If two or more live hypotheses are mutually incompatible, how can we test among them?
- Are the risks of trying this hypothesis reasonable in relation to the stakes?
- Were the consequences of acting on our hypotheses satisfying?
- Has our experimentation given us reasons to revise, abandon or warrant the hypothesis?
- Do hypotheses further revised need to be re-tested in experience?
- If none of the hypotheses proved useful in experience, do our questions need to be changed?

Stage Six: Implement Warranted Hypotheses

In Philosophy for Children it is often suggested that the final outcome of a philosophical inquiry is an ethical, political, aesthetic, or other kind of philosophical judgment.³⁵ Peirce insisted, however, that the ultimate meaning of a judgment is a habit of behavior and that the ultimate end of an inquiry is a reconstructed habit that ameliorates a problematic situation.³⁶ Peirce’s insight is both an important innovation to current intellectualist philosophical practices and a recollection of the therapeutic uses of philosophy promoted by the ancients.³⁷ It is further controversial, in philosophy as well as in education, to suggest that children should not only learn to think for themselves and to make their own ethical,

political, aesthetic and other philosophical judgments, but also learn to translate those judgments into action. The alternative, however, is to constrict the meaning of value inquiry and judgment to the realm of intellectual curiosity, and to recommend that children capable of making sound judgments should not use those judgments to guide their conduct but instead be guided solely by authoritative persons and codes.

The stage of implementation involves further practical reasoning about how to derive individual and collective habits out of new philosophical judgments.³⁸ However, both experimenting with and implementing philosophical judgments involve more than practical reasoning; they have an inescapable moral dimension. In asking how new philosophical insights can be acted on and what differences they should make in how we live, we are further reconstructing our view of an ideal self and an ideal world. Experimentation and implementation therefore necessarily involve these aspects of moral imagination.

Also, as Dewey explained, ends-in-view cannot be determined independently from means; the two must be mutually adjusted.³⁹ For this reason, though the stages of experimentation and implementation are in one sense post-dialogical, I include them as stages of the dialogical framework. In doing so I mean to draw attention to the interdependence of collaborative inquiry and individual reflection, of discourse and other modes of inquiry, and of inquiry and enjoyment as modes of experience. The ideal in all three cases is movement back and forth, through successive and ongoing inquiry.

The following scripted facilitation moves for implementing hypotheses⁴⁰ are meant to be suggestive only:

- What ought we to do about this?
- What are the implications of our new judgments for how we live? How should our new commitments be manifested?
- How can our new understandings/values be translated into action, especially in *this* time, in *this* place and under *these* circumstances?
- Are our current personal, institutional, communal and larger social habits consistent with our new judgments? If not, what adjustments should we make?
- How can we move this agenda forward in light of current realities?
- What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?

Reconstructed habits are ultimate but not final ends to inquiry, since new circumstances, new evidence, newly-recognized assumptions and other kinds of reasons may surface that bring these ends into doubt. Doubt that is sufficiently uncomfortable or intriguing constitutes a problem that calls for the initiation of a new arc of inquiry.⁴¹

Appendix: Reiteration of Dialogue Stages

Stage 1: Identify Issues Relevant to Purposes		
Product	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
Articulation of issues to be explored in the inquiry and purposes for doing so	Caring thinking: being aware of and articulating personal and collective interests, desires and values	• What feelings does this prompt, that call for resolution, <i>e.g.</i> frustration, confusion, curiosity, sensing something valuable? • What did we find puzzling, interesting or confusing? • What range of issues does this text / experience raise for us? What does it make us wonder about? • (What) does any of this matter? (How) are the issues relevant to our experience? What aspects of our experience do the issues potentially illuminate? What's at stake for us regarding these issues, personally and collectively? • What issues would be worth discussing? What do we want to know? What do we need to decide? What kinds of judgment seem called for? • What will our purposes be in conducting an inquiry into any of the issues raised? • Have we identified all of the significant aspects of the problems or issues to be explored, relevant to our purposes?
Stage 2: Formulate and Organize Relevant Questions		
Tasks	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
1. Generate questions 2. Organize questions into a sequence or another order	• Creative brainstorming • Organizing • Categorizing • Noticing redundancy	• What questions does the text, situation, <i>etc.</i>, raise for us? • Do our questions cover all of the important aspects of the issue? • Do any of these questions suggest other questions not yet asked? • Can we think of a question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue? • Is there redundancy among our questions? Could some of them be combined? • Is there an over-all question here? • Does this question have more than one part or sub-question? • Are there any "Q-Q's" (questions inside questions)? Does this question assume something that needs to be questioned itself? • Is there a logical priority to some of our questions? Do some questions require or assume answers to others? • Is there a priority of need or importance among the questions for us? • What other relationships are there among our questions?

Stage 3: Formulate and Organize Hypotheses in Response to Questions		
Product	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
One or more hypotheses or possible answers to one of the questions	Abduction: the informed generation of likely hypotheses	• What are some possible answers to the question? • What's your opinion? • What kind of hypothesis is that? Explanatory? Predictive? Evaluative? Something else? • Does that hypothesis respond to all or only part of the question? • Does that hypothesis respond to more than one question? • Can we try to see the issue from another point of view? • Are any other beliefs on this subject possible? • Is there redundancy among these hypotheses? • (How) are these two hypotheses different? • Is there a logical priority to some of our hypotheses? • Are any of these hypotheses in tension or conflict with each other?
Stage 4: Clarify and Test Hypotheses, and Confirm, Revise or Abandon		
Tasks	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
1. Clarify the hypothesis	A. Clarification of Meaning: defining, restating, making distinctions, using criteria, giving examples, qualifying, quantifying	• What do you mean by ____? How are you using the word ____? How should we define ____? • Are you saying that ____? I hear you saying ____. • What would be another way of putting that? • I didn't understand when you said ____. • Does there seem to be anything vague or ambiguous in this hypothesis? • What criteria are you using? • Do we need to be more specific? • Can someone else say what you understand his point to be? • Can you or someone else think of an example? How is that example relevant? • Are you making a distinction between ____ and ____? • How is ____ different from ____? • Would you qualify your categorical premise with "all," "most," or "some"? • What's the difference between what you're saying and what she said? • How would we go about testing this hypothesis?
	B. Detecting Assumptions	• Are there any hidden assumptions in this hypothesis? • Are we assuming that . . . ? • What is being assumed here? • Is that a reasonable assumption? • Why are we assuming it must be either this or that? • Why would someone make that assumption? • Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?

2. Test the hypothesis with arguments and evidence	A. Giving Reasons	• Why? What makes you think so? What are your reasons for saying that? • Do you agree or disagree, and why? • If someone wanted to disagree with you, what would she say? • How many different reasons can we think of? • Is that a good reason? • Are any of these reasons better than others?
	B. Categorical Inferences	• Is this a categorical statement / premise? • Would you qualify your categorical premise with "all," "most," or "some"? • Is it true that "all"/"no"/"some" ____ are ____? • What follows? • Are you making a categorical inference/syllogism? • Does that follow? Is that inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?
	C. Hypothetical Inferences	• If so, then what? What are the implications? • Is this a hypothetical (if-then) statement/premise? • In what sense is it true that "if P then Q"? Is it a predictive hypothesis (a hypothesis of correlation)? A causal hypothesis? A categorical or definitional hypothesis? • Does anything follow from this hypothetical premise? • Are you making a hypothetical inference/syllogism? • Is this inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?
	D. Inductive Arguments	• Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case? • How probable do the available reasons/evidence make this claim? • Is the evidence strong enough to support that conclusion? • Was the sample relied on to make this generalization randomly drawn? • Was the sample relied on to make this generalization representative of the population? What are the relevant characteristics? • How big was the sample relied on to make this generalization? • Was a control group used? • Are the risks of relying on this generalization reasonable in relation to the stakes?
	E. Arguments by Analogy	• What are the strengths and weaknesses of that analogy? • How are these two things or situations alike? • Is it reasonable to think that because these things are alike in this way that they will also be alike in that way?

	F. Identify and Defeat Fallacious Arguments	• Is that source an appropriate authority? • Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of who offered it? • Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of peer pressure? • Are you supporting that position just because it's a middle-of-the-road position? • Isn't what you're saying now inconsistent with what you said earlier? • Didn't that word mean something different when you used it earlier? • (Why) does it matter how many people agree about this? • Aren't you distorting the other person's position? • Isn't that distinction really a false dichotomy? • How is that relevant?
	G. Evaluating Evidence	• Can you or someone else think of an example? Are there other examples? • We have a number of examples already; can anyone offer a counter-example? • What would count as a counter-example to this generalization? • (How) is that evidence relevant? • Is that an established fact? How was it established? • Is that true? Is it always true? Is it true everywhere? How do we know? • Is this something that has to be determined by expert opinion? Where could we look for such opinion? What qualifies an expert to have an opinion about this? Is there agreement among qualified experts? • Is this something that could only be established by empirical research? Where could we look for such research? Are we qualified to conduct it ourselves? • Is this evidence strong enough, in view of what's at stake?
3. Confirm, revise or abandon hypothesis	Practical judgment	• Is that a reason to revise the hypothesis? • Is that a reason to abandon the hypothesis? • Are these arguments and/or this evidence sufficient to confirm this hypothesis? • Have we sufficiently tested this hypothesis with our best thinking? • Is there any other way this hypothesis might be mistaken? • Has the meaning of this hypothesis changed? How can we clarify the new meaning? • Looking at the surviving hypotheses, have we come closer to solving the problem or answering the question?

Stage 5: Experiment with Hypotheses and Confirm, Revise or Abandon		
Task	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
Contrive empirical experiments to determine whether the hypothesis resolves the issue begun with	Practical reasoning, hypothetical reasoning, moral imagination	- How could we act on this hypothesis? - How can we experiment with this hypothesis, i.e. test it in our experience outside the dialogue?
		- How will we be able to tell if it resolves the issue we began with? What might we expect to observe? What kinds of consequences would count as confirming and disconfirming the hypothesis? What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions? - If two or more live hypotheses are mutually incompatible, how can we test among them? - Are the risks of trying this hypothesis reasonable in relation to the stakes? - Were the consequences of acting on our hypotheses satisfying? - Has our experimentation given us reasons to revise, abandon or warrant the hypothesis? - Do hypotheses further revised need to be re-tested in experience? - If none of the hypotheses proved useful in experience, do our questions need to be changed?
Stage 6: Implement Warranted Hypotheses		
Product	Kinds of Thinking	Facilitation Moves
Reconstructed Habit	Moral imagination, practical reasoning	- What ought we to do about this? - What are the implications of our new judgments for how we live? How should our new commitments be manifested? - How can our new understandings / values be translated into action, especially in this time, in this place and under these circumstances? - Are our current personal, institutional, communal and larger social habits consistent with our new judgments? If not, what adjustments should we make? - How can we move this agenda forward in light of current realities? - What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?

Notes

My thanks to Nathan Brubaker, Peter Dlugos, James Heinegg, David Kennedy, Megan Lavery, and Matthew Lipman, for their helpful suggestions about this article.

1. See Karel L. Van der Leeuw: "Philosophical Dialogue and the Search for Truth," *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* 17:3 (2004): 17–23.

2. See "The Process of Inquiry," in *Philosophical Inquiry: An Instructional Manual to Accompany Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984): 4.

3. See Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Frederick S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Laurance J. Splitter and Ann M. Sharp, *Teaching for Better Thinking* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1995).

4. See, e.g., Nicholas Burbules, *Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice*, vol. 10 (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993).

5. Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan explain: "[Dialogue] . . . generates reflection. Very often, when people engage in dialogue with one another, they are compelled to reflect, to concentrate, to consider alternatives, to listen closely, to give careful attention to definitions and meanings, to recognize previously unthought of options, and in general to perform a vast number of mental activities that they might not have engaged in had the conversation never occurred." *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 2nd ed., 22.

6. Pierre Hadot's acclaimed *What Is Ancient Philosophy?* describes philosophy as practiced in the ancient schools as existential modes of life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, trans. Michael Chase). See also Thich Nhat Hanh: *Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, Calif.: Parallax Press, 1998).

7. John Dewey: *How We Think* (1933; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998); and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*; published as *John Dewey: The Later Works*, vol. 12 (1938; Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991).

8. Michael Walzer, for instance, describes fourteen non-deliberative activities necessarily involved in democratic politics, including demonstration, debate, bargaining, lobbying, and campaigning. *Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004), 90–109.

9. Lipman cautions that the community of inquiry approach should be used selectively with secondary school and college students who are ready to learn discipline-specific expert practice (*Thinking in Education* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 223–24). I have argued that teachers must mediate between the process of students constructing their own understandings and skills within a discipline and the process of experts constructing new disciplinary knowledge and skill. "Constructivism, Standards and the Classroom Community of Inquiry," *Educational Theory* 52:2 (Fall 2002): 397–408.

10. My own views on the range of "the philosophical" were aired in the article, "Are Philosophy and Children Good for Each Other?" in *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* 16:2 (Fall 2002): 9–11.

11. Louise Brandes Moura Ferreira: *The Role of a Science Story, Activities, and Dialogue Modeled on Philosophy for Children in Teaching Basic Science Process Skills to Fifth Graders*, Dissertation (Montclair, N.J.: Montclair State University, 2004).

12. Raymond Siegrist, *A Community of Mathematical Inquiry in a High School Setting*, Dissertation (Montclair, N.J.: Montclair State University, 2005); Nadia Stoyanova Kennedy,

The Role of Paradox in Argumentation and Concept Transformation in a Community of Mathematical Inquiry: A Dialectical Analysis, Dissertation (Montclair, N.J.: Montclair State University, 2005); Ed Elbers, "Classroom Interaction as Reflection: Learning and Teaching Mathematics in a Community of Inquiry," *Educational Studies in Mathematics* 54:2 (2003): 77–100; Marie-France Daniel, Louise Lafortune, Richard Pallascio, and Michael Schleifer, "The Developmental Dynamics of a Community of Philosophical Inquiry in an Elementary School Mathematics Classroom," *Thinking* 15:1 (2000): 2–9.

13. Peter Seixas, "The Community of Inquiry as a Basis for Knowledge and Learning: The Case of History," *American Educational Research Journal* 30:2 (Summer 1993): 305–24.

14. Sally Hagaman, "The Community of Inquiry: An Approach to Collaborative Learning," *Studies in Art Education* 31:3 (Spring 1990): 149–570.

15. Gilbert Burgh, Terri Field, and Mark Freakley, *Ethics and the Community of Inquiry: Education for Deliberative Democracy* (Melbourne: Thomson Social Science Press, 2006); Josephine Russell, "Moral Consciousness in a Community of Inquiry," *Journal of Moral Education* 31:2 (June 2002): 141–53.

16. Megan Laverty and Maughn Gregory, "Evaluating Classroom Dialogue: Reconciling Internal and External Accountability," forthcoming in *Theory and Research in Education* 5:3 (November 2007).

17. Some of these scripted facilitations moves were adapted from the list of "Socratic questions," in Splitter and Sharp, *Teaching for Better Thinking*, 56–57; and from Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 112–24.

18. I am indebted to Dr. Megan Laverty at Teachers College, Columbia University, for this insight.

19. See Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 139, 157.

20. Instruments for facilitating such internal and external evaluation are included in the *Philosophy for Children Practitioner Handbook* (Montclair, N.J.: IAPC, 2005).

21. David Hildebrand, "Analyzing a Philosophical Text as an Example of 'Inquiry,'" <http://davidhildebrand.org/teaching/handouts/inquiry.php>, last accessed 9 November 2005.

22. See "Education for Caring Thinking," chapter 12 in Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 261–71.

23. See Van der Leeuw's argument that "acceptance of the Socratic method excludes a doctrine of privileged access to philosophical truth or insight," "Philosophical Dialogue and the Search for Truth," 20.

24. Douglas Walton, *The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 90. Walton is paraphrasing and citing Monroe Beardsley, *Practical Logic* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950), 522.

25. Walton, *The New Dialectic*, 90.

26. The phrase "Q-Q's" was invented by one of the handiest facilitators of children's philosophical dialogue I have witnessed, Dr. Thomas E. Jackson, Director of the Philosophy in the Schools Project at the University of Hawaii, Manoa. See his "Gently Socratic Inquiry," in *Developing Minds: A Resource Book for Teaching Thinking*, 3rd ed., ed. Arthur L. Costa (Alexandria, Va.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2001), 459–65.

27. "An abduction is a method of forming a general prediction without any positive assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct

rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future.” *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (2): Elements of Logic*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), 270, electronic edition by IntelLex Corp, through Sprague Library at <http://library.montclair.edu/databases/philosophy.htm>, last accessed 15 November 2005.

28. “A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of completing the determination. . . . No communication of one person to another can be entirely definite, *i.e.*, non-vague. . . . [W]herever degree or any other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because no man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection of language.” *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (5): Pragmatism and Pragmatism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), 505–06, electronic edition by IntelLex Corp. through Sprague Library at <http://library.montclair.edu/databases/philosophy.htm>, last accessed 15 November 2005.

29. The quote is Walton’s paraphrase of Beardsley, *Practical Logic*, without page citation. Walton, *The New Dialectic*, 91.

30. Thomas C. Grey observes, “[N]o theory can ever be complete in the sense of stating all its own operative premises, [since] behind the articulated positions alleged to guide practice at any point, there is always a body of tacit beliefs.” “What Good is Legal Pragmatism?” in *Pragmatism in Law and Society*, ed. Michael Bring and William Weaver (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 19. Similarly, Richard Shusterman writes that, “apart from the non-linguistic understandings and experiences of which we are aware, there are more basic experiences or understandings of which we are not even conscious, but whose successful transaction provides the necessary background selection and organization of our field which enable consciousness to have a focus and emerge as a foreground.” *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 127.

31. Walton defines “fallacy” pragmatically: “In the new sense, a fallacy is a type of move in dialogue or argumentation sequence that often goes wrong or is used wrongly in a tricky, deceptive way in a dialogue exchange. . . . In the traditional sense a fallacy is a general type of argument pattern or form that is presumed to be generically wrong. In the new dialectical sense, a fallacy is a particular instance of an argument that is, in principle, a legitimate kind of argument, but that has been used wrongly in a particular case, according to the normative standards of dialogue appropriate for that case.” *The New Dialectic*, 257–58.

32. The framework I present for classroom dialogue involves what Walton calls “licit dialectical shifts” (*The New Dialectic*, 200–01) among most of the normative models of argumentation he identifies. Walton’s “negotiation dialogue,” in which the purpose of argumentation is “to try to get a good deal,” (100) is characteristic of stages one (identifying purposes and issues) and two (formulating discussion questions) of my framework. Stages three and four (formulating, clarifying and testing hypotheses) are each typified by Walton’s “persuasion dialogue,” “inquiry dialogue” and “information-seeking dialogue.” These stages involve what Walton calls “mixed discourse . . . where two or more types of dialogue are both present over the same course of argument” (218).

33. As Thich Nhat Hanh observes, "Understanding can only be attained through direct experience. The results of [our] practice should be tangible and verifiable." Nhat Hanh, *Interbeing*, 7–8. Similarly, Richard Shusterman writes, "Working in philosophy . . . is not merely the work of thought, for philosophy's solutions to life's riddles are not propositional knowledge but transformational practice. *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 25.

34. Walton, *The New Dialectic*, 111.

35. See "Strengthening the Power of Judgment," chapter 13 in Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 272–93.

36. "And what, then, is belief? . . . We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest. . . . The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise." Hartshorne and Weis, eds., *The Collected Papers* (5), 397–98, electronic edition by IntelLex Corp. through Sprague Library at <http://library.montclair.edu/databases/philosophy.htm>, last accessed 15 November 2005.

37. Hadot reminds us that for the ancients, philosophical discourse originated from an existential choice of a way of life tending toward wisdom and that it was not until the Middle Ages that philosophy was conceived as purely theoretical (*What Is Ancient Philosophy*, 3–6).

38. The implementation stage of the inquiry involves Walton's "deliberation, . . . a type of dialogue in which . . . parties reason together on how to proceed when they are confronted by a practical problem or conflict, or more generally, any need to consider taking a course of action. The most important kind of question posed in a deliberation is the 'how' question that seeks out a way of doing something" (*The New Dialectic*, 151). Walton demonstrates that in practical reasoning the textbook fallacy of *argumentum ad consequentiam* (appeal to consequences) is no fallacy, since what is at issue is neither the truth nor the validity of a conclusion but the practical consequences of accepting it (176).

39. *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 24.

40. Most of these facilitation questions were suggested by Dr. Jen Glaser of the Mandel Leadership Institute, Jerusalem, in her paper "Educating for Democracy and Social Justice," presented at the Austrian Center of Philosophy for Children 20th Anniversary Conference, Graz, October 2005.

41. Compare Peirce: "A true doubt is accordingly a doubt which really interferes with the smooth working of the belief-habit. Every natural or inbred belief manifests itself in natural or inbred ways of acting, which in fact constitute it a belief-habit. (I need not repeat that I do not say that it is the single deeds that constitute the habit. It is the single 'ways,' which are conditional propositions, each general). A true doubt of such a belief must interfere with this natural mode of acting." Hartshorne and Weis, eds., *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (5), 510, electronic edition by IntelLex Corp. through Sprague Library at <http://library.montclair.edu/databases/philosophy.htm>, last accessed 15 November 2005.

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